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UNION RIGHT OF REPLY TO EMPLOYER
ON-THE-JOB SPEECHES:
THE NLRB TAKES A NEW APPROACH*
SECTION 8(1) of the Wagner Act branded employer interference with
employees' right to self-organization an unfair labor practice., Interpretation
of this provision gradually permitted employer indulgence in general non-
coercive propaganda against unionization, but barred utterances found part
of a coercive course of conduct or embodying actual or implied threats of
economic reprisal.2 And in 1946, the NLRB's Clark Bros. decision held that
employers' anti-union speeches to compulsorily assembled employees on com-
pany time and premises violated their freedom to determine whether or not
to receive advice concerning their right to self-organization.3 Illegalization
of "captive audience" speeches deprived employers of an effective technique
for influencing employees' votes in NLRB representation elections.
*Bonwit Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Oct. 4, 1951) ; Biltmore Manufacturing Co., 97
N.L.R.B. No. 128 (Dec. 31, 1951).
1. Section 8(1) of the NLRA, popularly known as the Wagner Act, made it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(1)
(1946). Section 7 provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing. . . ." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1946). Taft-Hartley
left the quoted portions of these sections unchanged.
2. E.g., NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 768 (1944); Oval Wood Dish Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 1129, 1138 (1945), During
the first years of Wagner Act administration, however,.the NLRB had deemed almost any
employer anti-union expression a -violation of § 8(1). Employee fear of economic retri-
bution was thought to automatically lend any "preferential" statement a coercive effect,
For the classic statement, see NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
For discussions of these gradual developments under the Wagner Act, see 2 TMLE,
LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLEcTivE BARGAINING §§ 252, 286 (1940) (Supp. 1947) ; Daykin,
Employer's Right of Free Speech in Industry under the NLRA, 40 IuL. L. Rv. 185
(1945); Morgan, Einployer's Freedom of Speech and the Wagner Act, 20 TuILANE L,
Rzv. 469 (1946); Comment, 34 CALIF. L. Rzv. 415 (1946). For valuable collection of
cases, see the NLRB's Annual Reports.
3. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946). Employer compelled its employees to assemble during
working hours to hear its anti-union campaign speeches broadcast throughout the plant
an hour before a representation election. Convening of a "captive audience" by employer-
control of working hour activities was held a per se violation of § 8(1).
Prior to Clark Bros., compulsory attendance at anti-union meetings was deemed an
element of a coercive course of conduct. Thompson Products, Inc., 60 N.LR.B. 1381, 1385
(1945); Van Raalte, Inc., 69 N.L.R.B. 1326, 1333 (1946). But see dicta in NLRB v.
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The Taft-Hartley Act, however, caused a re-evaluation of permissible
employer speech. Directed in part against the NLRB's Clark Bros. holding,
Section 8(c) provided that the "expressing of views... shall not constitute
... an unfair labor practice... if such expression contains no threat of re-
prisal, or force or promise of benefit." 4 Before the effective date of the Act,
the Second Circuit affirmed the Clark Bros. decision, but modified the Board
order to permit the employer to address his employees on company time and
property, provided the union was accorded a similar opportunity.5 Confronted
with Section 8(c) and its legislative history, however, the NLRB disregarded
the Second Circuit opinion and soon abandoned the "captive audience" con-
Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 498 (8th Cir. 1946) (one month after Clark case),
reversing 64 N.L.R.B. 432 (1945). The Board had found the speech coercive in a context
of discriminatory discharges. With the discharges upheld, that finding was necessarily
reversed. See 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 49 (1947). For case classification, see Note, 25 N.C.L
REv. 216, 224 (1947).
4. Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.
(Supp. 1951) ("Taft-Hartley Act"). Section 8(c) reads in full: "The expressing of any
views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal,
or force or promise of benefit" 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (Supp. 1951).
"The Board has place a limited construction upon [Supreme Court decisions guaran-
teeing employer free speech] by holding such speeches by employers to be coercive if...
the speech was made in the plant on working time (Clark Brothers, 70 X.L.R.B. 60
(1946)). The committee believes these decisions to be too restrictive... ." Si:. R. N o.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 24 (1947), accompanying the Taft-Hartley Act. For Con-
gressional history of § 8(c) with majority and minority views on the permissible content
of employer anti-union expressions; the status of speech as part of "coercive course of
conduct"; and evidential admissibility of privileged statements to prove motive for dis-
criminatory discharges; see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-4, 35, 41 (1947) ;
SEx. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 54, 84 (1947) ; H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8, 45 (1947). Also see 13 NLRB Aim. Ru. 49 (194S); and, e.g., NLRB v.
Kropp Forge Co., 178 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950). For
analysis, see 2 TELEmR, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 398.105-7 (1950) ; Burstein, Free SPeech
for Employers, 1 LABOR L.J. 425 (1950); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Ma.nagement
Relations Act, 61 H.Av. L. Rxv. 1, 15-20 (1947) ; Daylkn, The Employers' Right of Free
Speech Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 37 IowA L. REv. 212 (1952) ; Herzog & Rikoon, The
Employer aid the First Amendment, 22 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 109 (1947) ; Rose, Freedom of
Speech for Employer and Employee, 35 A.B.A.J. 637 (1949) ; Comment, 2 SoT-rmsrxm.
L. J. 159 (1948).
5. NLRB v. Clark Bros., 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. July 29, 1947). Section 8(c) took
effect on Aug. 22, 1947, 60 days after enactment on June 23, 1947.
"An employer has an interest in presenting his views on labor relations to his em-
ployees. We should hesitate to hold that he may not do this on company time and pay,
provided a similar opportunity to address them were accorded represcntatives of the urion.
." NLRB v. Clark Bros., 163 F.2d 373, 376 (emphasis added).
The court's decree enforcing the Board order modified its provisions against "Vm-
pelling ... employees during working time to listen to speeches relating to self-organi-
zation . . ." by adding "without according similar opportunity to address them to the
Union!" 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 49 (1947).
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cept.6 And in S&S Corrugated Paper Machinery Co., the Board specifically
held that employers could make non-coercive anti-union speeches to assem-
blages of company employees during working hours without granting the
union an equivalent opportunity to reply.7
In the recent Bonwit Teller decision,8 however, the NLRB overruled the
Corrugated case 9 and took a new approach to employer speeches on company
time and premises. Bonwit Teller had enforced the broad no-solicitation rule
permitted by the NLRB in retail department stores. Intended to prevent dis-
ruption of business, this company rule forbids union activity at any time on
the selling floor. 10 But six days before a run-off representation election, the
6. In Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (May 13, 1948), 48 COL. L. RLv. 1098
(1948), the Board held that "The language of 8(c) ... and its legislative history, makes
it clear that the [compulsory audience] doctrine of the Clark Bros. case no longer exists
as a basis for finding unfair labor practices... ." Subsequent cases agreed. E.g., Fontaine
Converting Works, 77 N.L.R.B. 1386 (1948); Hinde & Dauch Paper Co., 78 N.L.R.B.
488, 489 (1948) ; Kentucky Utilities Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 981, 982 (1949) ; Charroin Mfg. Co.,
88 N.L.R.B. 38, 40 (1950).
Even before the Board in Babcock & Wilcox had abandoned the "captive audience"
doctrine, commentators deemed it "plainly overruled" by § 8(c). Cox, supra note 4, at 15.
7. 89 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1364 (1950).
Prior to Babcock & Wilcox, supra note 6, in Merry Bros. Brick & Tile Co., 75 N.L.
R.B. 136, 138 (Oct. 27, 1947), the effect of § 8(c) on the Trial Examiner's "captive audi-
ence" finding was not reached. The Board construed the Second Circuit's opinion in the
Clark case as requiring a union request for the similar opportunity to address the em-
ployees, which request was not proven in the case at hand. In a later case, findings by a
Trial Examiner that "it appeared no similar opportunity was granted to the labor organi-
zation to address the employees," without finding a union request, were not relied upon.
Loudenville Milling Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 304, 307, 322 (1948). No union reply request ap-
peared in any "captive audience" case until S&S Corrugated.
8. 96 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Oct. 4, 1951).
9. "To the extent that our decision herein may be deemed to be inconsistent with the
Board's decision in S&S Corrngated Paper Machinery Co. Inc., 89 NLRB 1363, that
decision is hereby overruled, but Babcock & Wilcox is adhered to." Bonwit Teller, 96
N.L.R.B. No. 73, p. 9, n.12 (Oct. 4, 1951) (mimeo).
10. In judging the validity of company restrictions on union activity, the NLRB must
balance the property rights of the employer and his interest in efficient production and dis-
cipline against employee rights of self-organization. Contentions that the Fifth Amend-
ment protects the employer against any interference with his property rights have been
rejected. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 (1945); NLRB v. Cities
Service Oil Co., 122 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1941) ; cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
505-6 (1946).
Company no-solicitation rules forbidding union organizing activity during working
hours are presumed valid if not applied in a discriminatory manner. E.g., Jaques Power
Saw Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 440, 444 (1949). Rules restricting solicitation of union memberships
on company property during non-working hours are presumed invalid, as a violation of
§ 8(a) (1), in the absence of special circumstances. Republic Aviation Co. v. NLRB,
mipra; Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), enforcement granted, 142 F.2d
1009 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,323 U.S. 730 (1945) ; I. F. Sales Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 137, 138
(1949) (paid luncheon and rest periods not "working time"). Such special circumstances
exist in department stores which, because of the presence of customers, may forbid union
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store closed its doors a half-hour early and instructed its employees to
assemble on the main selling floor."1 Although the company's president pre-
sented arguments against voting for the Retail Clerks' International Asso-
ciation, a union request for an equivalent opportunity to address the employees
on company time and premises was denied.'- The union lost the election and
protested to the NLRB. Sidestepping the "captive audience" problem,23 the
Board, salvaging the Second Circuit's Clark Bros. doctrine,14 held the denial
of the union's reply request an unfair labor practice, and set the election aside.
activity at any time on its selling floors. Solicitation, even during employees' off-duty time,
may there disrupt business. E.g., May Department Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 931 (1944).
enforcement granted, 154 F2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Marshall Field & Co., 93 N.L.R.B. No.
11 (Feb. 15, 1952) (good review of permissible extent of rule with clarification of right of
non-employee organizers to solicit off-duty employees in non-selling areas of the store).
No-solicitation rules were not affected by the Taft-Hartley Act. 13 NLRB .Afln. Ra,.
52 (1948).
For more detailed review of no-solicitation rules, see Daykin, Employes' Right to
Organice on Company Thne and Property, 42 ILL. L. REv. 301 (1947) ; Note, 26 On&
L. REv. 298 (1947).
11. The previous election had not resulted in a majority vote for either of the two
contesting unions or the "no-union" choice. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers, C.LO.
received the least votes and was eliminated, and the Board directed a run-off election be-
tween the Retail Clerks' International Association, AFL, and "no-union" to be held Sep-
tember 15, 1949.
12. "On September 12, 1949, the RCIA wrote to the Respondent requesting an oppor-
tunity to address the employees under conditions comparable to those under which
Rudolph's speech was delievered. The Respondent did not acknowledge this letter." In-
termediate Report, p. 4, Bonwit Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Oct 4, 1951).
13. Since convoking a "compulsory" audience is no longer unlawful, see note 6 supra,
the Trial Examiner found it unnecessary to resolve the conflict in evidence as to whether
or not employees were forced to attend the meeting. Id. at 11. The Board agreed, not find-
ing "illegal ... the manner in which (the employer) assembled its audience." Bonit
Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. No. 73 at p. 10.
Refusal to find a "captive audience" illegal per se rests on statutory interpretation
founded only on § 3(c) legislative history condemnation of the Board's Clark Bros. de-
cision and on modification of that decision by the Second Circuit. See notes 4, 5 supra.
The First Amendment would probably not protect speech delivered to an involuntary
audience. "The right of free speech is guaranteed to every citizen that he may reach the
minds of willing listeners.... To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of
others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself." Justice Reed in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 78 (1949) (emphasis added) (upholding a city ordinance which forbade sound trucks
on the public streets, as applied to speeches on a labor dispute). But cf. Pub. Util. Comm. v.
Pollak, 20 U.S. L. kVEax 4343 (May 27, 1952) (music and non-controversial spot announce-
ments to bus passengers held constitutional); and see NLRB v. Montgomery Ward,
157 F.2d 486, 499 (8th Cir. 1946) (labor "captive audience" permissible; "First Amend-
ment is concerned with the freedom of thought and expression of the speaker or writer,
not with conditions under which the auditor or listener receives the message"). See note
3 supra and Notes, 15 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 367 (1947) ; 16 FonD. L. REv. 135 (1947).
14. See note 5 supra. For argument that the relevant portion of Clark Bros. was mere
dictum in addition to being otherwise inapplicable, see Bonvit Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. Nu.
73, p. 14 (Oct. 4, 1951) (dissenting opinion). For the majority's refutation, see id. at ,
n.13.
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The Board's decision relied on two separate grounds. Under the narrower
rationale, refusal to permit the union rebuttal resulted in discriminatory appli-
cation of an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule.15 Settled doctrine prevents
an employer from applying the rule in such a way as to favor one union over
another, or to preclude union solicitation while permitting anti-union em-
ployees or third parties to campaign freely. 16 Logically, the Board majority
reasoned, the rule is discriminatorily applied as well when employers campaign
on company premises while denying unions the same privilege." Under the
Board's "more fundamental consideration," moreover, the right of employees
15. Id. at 4.
16. Although a no-solicitation rule is valid on its face, the discriminatory promul-
gation or application of such rules violates § 8(a) (1). See note 10 supra and articles cited.
The employer may not restrict solicitation of its employees on company time or prop-
erty while permitting similar activity by adherents of a more-favored union. NLRB v.
Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 222 (1940) ; Bingham's Son Mfg. Co., 80 N.L.
R.B. 1612, 1613 (1948) (AFL on-the-job speech invited while CIO organizing activity
prohibited). Nor may campaigning by anti-union employees be permitted while a pro-union
activity ban is enforced. NLRB v. Harbison-Walker Co., 135 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1943);
Lindley Box and Paper Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 553, 554 (1947) (working hour meeting by anti-
union employees). Permitting anti-union activity on company property by town business-
men while denying the same privileges to pro-union campaigning is also illegal. NLRB v.
American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1946).
17. Employer prohibition of pro-union activity on company time and premises while
permitting anti-union activity thereon clearly violates § 8(a) (1). See note 16 supra. But
until Bonwit Teller, holdings (on whether anti-union campaigning by the employer itself
came within the scope of company no-solicitation rules) were confused.
Employer anti-union speechmaking and leaflet distribution during working hours de-
spite his ban on pro-union activity was held discriminatory conduct by a Trial Examiner,
and affirmed by the Board without comment. Goodall Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 814, 841 (1949).
But the five judicial authorities cited all involved the employer's permitting employee or
third party activity.
Aside from Goodall, .npra, the only instancei where campaigning by management It-
self was held violative of company no-solicitation rules involved supervisors who circu-
lated employee petitions repudiating the union. Kentucky Utilities Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 981,
982 (1949) ; Allen-Morrison Sign Co. Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1948) ; Macon Textiles,
Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1525, 1527, 1550 (1948) ; Editorial 'El Imparcial' Inc., 92 N.L.R.B.
1790, 1796 (1951). A possible explanation of these cases may be that "employer solicita-
tion of employees to repudiate their union are coercive per so and are not protected by
§8(c) as an expression of 'views, arguments and opinions.'" Kentucky Utilities Co.,
supra at 982.
Both before and after Goodall, employer campaigning was considered from the view-
point of permissible speech. Its relationship to no-solicitation rules was disregarded even
where other discriminatory violations of that rule were found. E.g., NLRB v. Winona
Knitting Mills, Inc., 163 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Lindley Box & Paper Co., supra note
16; Salant & Salant, 92 N.L.R.B. 343, 356 (1950); Grove Regulator Co., 66 N.L.R.B.
1102, 1104 (1946) (all involving employer speeches on company time and property) ; and
Salant & Salant, 92 N.L.R.B. 417 (1950) (supervisor's -remarks). Even where employer
circulation of anti-union petitions was held a discriminatory violation of a no-solicitation
rule, Allen-Morrison Sign Co., supra, an anti-union employer speech was not so tested,
And in Fontaine Converting Works, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1386, 1387 (1948), involving a
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freely to select or reject union representation includes the right to hear both
sides under conditions reasonably approximating equality.3s And in the cir-
cumstances present in the case, only the employer's approval of the union's
request for a reply speech could have achieved that equality.10 The broad no-
solicitation rule had drastically curtailed union contact with employees ;20 the
proximity of the speech to election day had limited any rebuttal opportunities
by ordinary union organizational techniques ;21 other unfair labor practices
had occurred, including a "promise of benefit," unprotected by § 8(c), in the
employer's speech, found to hamper further the employees' freedom of
choice.22
speech to a compulsory audience, the employer himself attempted to prove the existence
of a no-solicitation rule to justify other conduct.
Board Member Reynolds, dissenting in Bonvut Teller, was thus substantially correct
in maintaining that "[i]n the past, the Board has not held that an employer's privilege of
fair comment to all his assembled employees concerning a forthcoming election was cir-
cumscribed by the restrictions inherent in no-solicitation rules." 96 N.L.R.B. No. 73, p. 12.
His contention that § 8(c) prevents a change in that policy seems less supportable. See
note 46 infra. The Bonwit Teller majority has clarified the previous confusion by a more
realistic attitude that employers may not exempt themselves from their own election cam-
paign rules.
18. 96 N.L.R.B. No. 73, p. 6. While the right of information is not referred to speci-
fically among the employees' Tight to self-organization as guaranteed by § 7, that section
was read to include "the full freedom to receive aid, advice and information from others
concerning their rights and their enjoynent." Harlan Fuel Co., 3 N.LR.B. 2.5, 32 (1933).
Bonwit Teller's inclusion of equal opportunity to hear both sides as a concomitant of
the employees' right of information accords with democratic ideas of free choice based on
an informed electorate. Furthermore, the NLRB has been reluctant to set aside an elec-
tion on inaccurate, untrue or exaggerated campaign propaganda grounds, and leaves to
the interested parties a counteracting function. See 14 NLRB A::n;. REP. 29 (1949) ; 15
NLRB ANN. REi. 8 3 (1950). The parties, of course, cannot perform that function if
employees can hear only one side.
19. Bonwit Teller, 96 N.LR.B. No. 73, p. 7.
20. "Whatever opportunity that the Union may have had to solicit employees outside
of the store or at union meetings, it is clear that the Respondent's broad no-solicitation
rules had deprived RCIA of the most effective means of contact with employees-namely,
solicitation of employees while they were in the store." Ibid.
21. Ibid. The dissent, however, maintained that the speech six days before the election
gave "ample time for RCIA to reply-if opportunity to reply be deemed imperative-
through usual union channels of communication, namely, campaign leaflets or union hall
addresses." Id. at 14. For editorial approval of this position, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1951,
p. 26, coL 2; and David Lawrence, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 9, 1951, p. 4, col. 1. See
notes 33-7 infra.
22. References in the-president's speech to pending wage increases to be forthcoming
after the election without the need for the RCIA were held to violate § 8(a) (1) as a
"promise of benefit" not protected by §8(c). Bonwit Teller, 96 N.L.LB. No. 73, p.3.
Statements by supervisory employees that wage increases would be further deferred if
RCIA won the election, and that favorable wage, promotion and layoff pulicies would be
retracted were also held unfair labor practices interfering with a free choice in the election.
Id. at 4. But all other arguments in the president's on-the-job speeches as well as in the
company anti-union leaflets were held within the privileged category of § 3(c) free speech.
Intermediate Report, Bonwit Teller, stupra, at 7.
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While the Board failed to delineate the particular circumstances demanding
equal opportunity to be heard in other fact situations,23 its recent decision in
Biltmore Manufacturing Co.24 throws some light on the Bonwit Teller ruling.
The plant manager of Biltmore, an industrial concern, spoke against the
United Textile Workers to his assembled employees on company time only
two hours before a- decertification election.25 At this meeting he refused to
permit an answer by one of the employees present. The union lost the election,
and complained in representation proceedings before the Board. Unlike Bon-
wit Teller, the record showed neither a general no-solicitation rule nor a back-
ground of unfair labor practices. Nevertheless, the Board set the election
aside,26 relying mainly on the employer's refusal to accord the union a chance
23. See discussion of Bonwit Teller in 28 LAB. RFmi. REy. (Analysis) 105 (Oct. 8,
1951), stressing the uncertain consequences of the decision. In fact, a Regional NLRB
Director upheld a consent election over union objections that opportunity to reply to an
employer speech delivered on company time and premises the day prior to the election had
been denied. He stressed absence of a strictly enforced no-solicitation rule in Tespondent
department store and lack of a background of unfair labor practices to distinguish Boinit
Teller. England Brothers, Inc., 29 LAB. Rm. REP. 93 (Dec. 13, 1951). On the basis of
Biltmore Manufacturing Co., 97 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (Dec. 29, 1951), the Regional Director
subsequently reversed himself and set aside the election results. 29 LAB. REL. Rrx,. 128
(Jan. 14, 1952).
24. 97 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (Dec. 29, 1951).
25. Decertification petitions, asserting that the currently recognized union no longer
represents a majority of the employees, may be filed by employees under § 9(c) (1) (A)
(ii) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
26. Also, unlike Bonwit Teller, no unfair labor practice proceeding was instituted to
complement this representation case. Biltmore may not be regarded as precedent for future
unfair labor practice cases since "conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders tni-
probable a free choice will sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even though that
conduct may not constitute an unfair labor practice." General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126
(1948), 58 YALE L.J. 165. (1948) (Section 8(c) applies only to unfair labor practices, not
representation cases; extreme anti-union employer campaign methods, privileged against the
unfair labor practice charge, warranted setting the election aside). Accord, Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 935, 938 (1950). Nevertheless, the NLRB relies spar-
ingly on this dichotomy, repeatedly distinguishing General Shoe and utilizing standards
for setting aside an election for employer anti-union campaigning largely coinciding with
those in a § 8(a) (1) unfair labor practice proceeding, including § 8(c) defenses. E.p.,
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 79 N.L.R.B. 1399 (1948) ; Hinde & Dauch Paper Co., 78
N.L.R.B. 488 (1948). See MILLIS & Baowx, FROM THE WAGNER Acr TO TAFr-HARTEv
526-8 (1950).
And, no language in the Biltmore opinion implies a limitation to representation pro-
ceedings. On the contrary, § 8(c) defenses were allowed, and a violation of § 7, which
constitutes an unfair labor practice, was found.
That no unfair labor practice proceeding took place is probably due to current NLRB
policy of granting precedence to election cases over certain types of unfair labor practice
cases. The Board thus "sacrifices" the latter because of increasing rate of cases handled
by a smaller staff. 22 LAB. REL REP. 225 (Mar. 17, 1952). The same reason probably ex-
plains lack of unfair labor practice proceedings supplementing later representation cases
relying on the Bomvit Teller and Biltmore union Tight of reply. Bernadin Bottle Cap Co.,
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to reply at the meeting as a denial of equal opportunity 2 7 under the Bonlit
Teller holding.
The Board's Biltmore opinion, however, does not establish factual criteria
for deciding when an employer must grant a request for a union reply talk.
That some form of adequate union reply to an employer speech must be avail-
able is clear from the holding.2 But the majority's reasoning pointed to the
two-hour time factor as maldng a rebuttal talk at the employer meeting the
only adequate form of union reply.2 0 Narrowly read, therefore, when the
union has more time for effective rebuttal, Biltmore might be satisfied by a
union reply through a medium other than an on-the-job talk. The tenor of
the Board's opinion, however, favors a broader view, independent of any
consideration of time: whenever pending a representation election -0 the em-
ployer addresses his employees on company time and premises, equality of
opportunity demands that the union be permitted to reply by a speech under
equivalent conditions.3
1
97 N.L.R.B. No. 241 (Feb. 5, 1952); Bellnap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 93 N.LR.B. No. 83
(Mar. 10, 1952). Representation cases can not result in cease and desist orders, which are
limited by § 10 to unfair labor practices. But since failure to file an unfair labor practice
charge in these cases was probably discretionary, such proceedings would quickly ensue if
the employer continued his proscribed conduct.
27. Analogy was also made to the Bonwit Teller alternative ground of discriminatory
violation of a no-solicitation rule. Even though a no-solicitation rule did not here exist,
the Board invoked the same legal consequences: "[I]n either case, the Employer is dis-
criminating in favor of anti-union adherents to the serious detriment of union adherents."
Biltmore Manufacturing Co., 97 N.L.RIB. No. 128, p. 3 (Dec. 29, 1951).
28. Since the speech ,.as made just two hours before the election, "[t]here was no
opportunity for the union adherents to reply other than in the manner requested." IMd.
See note 49 infra.
29. See note 28 supra.
30. It is doubtful whether an equal opportunity Tule applies to non-representation
union problems. Anchor Rome Mills, 6 N.L.R.B. 1120 (1949) (refusal to permit union
reply to employer on-the-job speech in organized plant concerning impending strike held
lawful; majority status of union as collective bargaining representative never questioned
by employer), vras cited by the Bonu'it Teller dissenting opinion together with the S & S
Corrugated case, see text at note 7 supra, as precedents contrary to the majority proposi-
tion. While S & S Corrugated was overruled, see note 9 supra, the Bom,:4t Teller majority
made no reference to the Anchor Rome Mills case, probably indicating that a recognized
union whose collective bargaining status is unchallenged has better opportunity to convey
its views to its own members than a union struggling to contact employees unfamiliar with
its policies and rendered hostile by employer propaganda.
Once a plant has been organized, the presence of official union shop stewards among
the workers may be the most effective union method of communication, eliminating the
need for a union reply speech. See BA=an, BALLANTIN- & TRuE, TrA zs!M Nm IIo O-
mATION THROUGH MANAGEMENT AND UNION CHANNELS 53, 60, 109 (1949) (hereinafter
cited as BA=s-i, BALLANTINE & TRuE) ; PETERS, COMMUNICATIONS ,VITIm INDUSTRY 131
(1949). In fact, one expert has stated that "[t]he organised wage-earner usually gets more
information from his union than from management." Dodge, Conccrning Public Rclations
and the Labor Question, 7 Pun. Rx.. J. 3, 4 (Mar. 1951) (emphasis added).
31. "The employer dedicated company time and property to a campaign against the
union, while refusing to accord the wutim an opportunity to reply under equal circur.-
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Since no other real campaign equivalent to employer speechmaking during
working hours is open to a union,3 2 broad reading of Biltmore better implements
the "equal opportunity" rule. Psychological tests indicate that leaflets or other
printed propaganda devices cannot match the persuasive power of oral pre-
sentations;33 and printed material can reach only a small minority of the full
audience guaranteed the employer by his control over working time.8 4 Union
meetings to organize employees tired from their day's work and faced with
stances." Biltmore Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. No. 128, p. 4 (Dec. 31, 1951) (emphasis added).
The dissent ascribed this broad view to the majority.
Also, subsequent to Biltnwre, the Board has required union replies to employer on-the-
job speeches made the same day as the election without specifying the number of hours,
Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (Mar. 10, 1952); and the day before
election, Bernadin Bottle Cap Co., 97 N.L.R.B. No. 241 (Feb. 5, 1952). As in Billmore,
the Board apparently made no attempt to evaluate or even ascertain any feasible alternative
campaign media.
32. See notes 33-7 infra.
33. See KLAPPER, THE EsFmcTs OF MAss MEDIA pt. 2, p. 10 (1949). For typical test-
ing procedures and findings, see Wilke, An Experimental Comparison of the Speech, the
Radio, and the Printed Page as Propaganda Devices in ARcHivEs OF PsYcHoLOoY No.
169 (Columbia University Press 1934). Election speechmaking even where transmitted
by radio was more effective than newspapers because of the more personal relationship
between speaker and audience. LAZARSFELD, BERELSON AND GAUDET, THE Pposra's CHoxcr
129 (1948). A distinction must be made between the communication goals of imparting
factual knowledge and of modifying opinions. KLAPPER, op. cit. supra, at pt. 4, p. 10. In-
consistent experiments as to retention of factual material must be distinguished from modi-
fication of opinion in which aural presentation has been unanimously found superior to
printed material. Id. at pt. 2, p. 10.
Polls found that employees favored verbal over written communications, with the pos-
sible exception of bulletin boards. See BAKER, BALLANTINE & TRUE 42, 43, 84, 95 (1949).
Leaflets or "throwaways" must also be much briefer than the more thorough argumenta-
tion in speechmaking. See ILGWU, HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNION METHODS 43 (1948);
DooD, PuBLIc OPINION AND PROPAGANDA 461 (1948).
For information on content analysis of arguments, and their effect on worker predis-
positions, see Bakke, Why Workers Join Unions in BAKKE & KERR, UNIONS, MANAGV-
iMENT AND THE PUBLIC 41 (1949); BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN ACTION c.2 (1948);
Seidman, London & Karsh, Why Workers Join Unions, 274 ANNALS 75 (Mar. 1951);
Whyte, Who Goes Union, and Why?, 23 PERSONNEL J. 215 (1944).
34. Union literature such as union newspapers and pamphlets are usually read only
by a comparatively small minority of the employees even in organized plants where they
can be mailed to members or distributed by shop stewards with the full coopcration of
management See BAKER, BALLANTINE & TRUE, 51, 60, 112, 131; PETERs, COmmUNcATION
WITHIN INDUSTRY 132 (1950).
And while the right to distribute union literature on company property has often been
upheld, NLRB v. Le Tourneau Co., 324 U.S. 793 (1945), 157 A.L.1R 1088 (1945); Caro-
lina Mills, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1142 (1951), enforcement granted, 190 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.
1951) ; distribution may be prohibited where its dissemination is feasible outside plant gates,
Newport News Children's Dress Co., Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 1521 (1950), especially in order to
prevent littering of the premises, Colonial Shirt Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (Oct. 10, 1951)
(distinction drawn between a non-working hour ban on literature distribution as com-
pared to ban on solicitation). See note 10 supra. In the Bonwit Teller case, while leaflets
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added travel are usually poorly attended.3 Comprehensive individual solicita-
tion off the premises is rarely achieved because of cost, time, and difficulty
of locating workers at home.36 And campaigning by individual employee-
organizers on a catch-as-can basis in the plant, even when not precluded by no-
solicitation rules, hardly substitutes for the systematic arguments that can be
were handed out frequently on the sidewalk in front of the store's employee's entrance,
Brief for Respondent, pp. 22-3, Bonwit Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Oct. 4, 1951), ade-
quate coverage of the multitudes of employees caught in the concentrated rush to and from
work on a busy New York thoroughfare could hardly be expected.
35. See BAER, BALLANTINE & TRUE at 49, 110; PxrERs, Co:rt~umct. on WVrrmi
IxnusTY 131 (1950). Workers whose jobs fill their days are tired and amusement-hungry
at night; they are not eager to break away from their families or forego "dates" or re-
laxation to attend union meetings. Kopald, Denwcracy and Leadership in BAnim & KEnl,
UNIONS, MANAGEMENT AND THE PUBLIC 180 (1949). For British experience, see GoLD-
STEIN, THE GovmxmNnr OF BRITISH TRADE UNiONs 246-61 (1952). Unorganized workers,
due to fear of incurring employee disfavor and risking discharge, attend union meetings
even more rarely. The union may therefore consider the holding of meetings inadvisable,
especially in small cities where everyone is known, until it achieves sufficient strength.
ILGWU, HANDOOK OF TRADE UNION MarHons 10 (1948).
The Bonwit Teller dissent, 96 N.L.R.B. No. 73, at p. 13, cited a Supreme Court dictum
in NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226, 230 (1949) (which held that employers
may not deny to union the use of only available meeting hall in company town) : "We
cannot equate a company dominated North Carolina mill town with the vast metropolitan
centers where a number of halls are available within easy reach of prospective union
members." But in Stowe there vras no evidence of employer anti-union speeches on com-
pany time and premises. And the Bonwit Teller issue seems not whether union halls are
available in the abstract, but whether such a meeting compares in effectiveness with an
on-the-job speech. Moreover, numerical availability of union halls in large cities may be
more than counterbalanced by necessary employee travel from widely scattered residential
areas. For view in accord with the Bonuit Teller dissent, see Note, Employer's Failure
to Pemnit Union Opportunity to Spea on Company Time and Properly, 100 U. or P.
L. REv. 911, 914 (1952) (which fails to recognize difference between cases involving right
of access to company premises for union organizers on their own initiative, which may be
governed by a "principle of necessity," and the campaign equality doctrine of Bonuit
Teller, put into play only to counterbalance the unfair advantage of unilateral employer
on-the-job speechmaking).
Union sound truck speeches at company gates are feasible only where mills and fac-
tories employ large numbers of workers and are located in sparsely settled areas with
limited avenues of exit. See ILGWU, op. cit. .sipra, at 111 (194); cf. B mwAsn, L non
UmoNs IN ACTION 26 (1948). Aside from dependence on good weather, the speechmaker
addresses a rapidly changing group of passing workers anxious to get home from work
and thus can make only short appeals. See Doon, PUBLIC OPINION AND PrOPAGAND. 529-
32 (1948).
36. This was not even mentioned by either the Bonit Teller dissent or in newspaper
attacks on the decision among feasible alternatives to an employer on-the-job speech. See
note 21 supra. Neither is it considered by the NLRB in weighing alternatives to union
distribution of literature on the premises. See cases cited at note 34 supra. Individual home
visits are best utilized at the start of a campaign to convince a few key workers rather
than as an instrument of mass communication. See BRooKs, WHEN LABOR OrGA.NaIzLs 2
(1937). For limitations on home visits, see BARBAsn, LAieR UNIONS mJ AcIo: 26
(1948).
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presented at a mass meeting on working time. 87 Furthermore, the subtle
psychological coercion implicit in forcing an employee to listen to his em-
ployer's speech on his premises and on working time 88 may be counterbalanced
by the morale boost of permitting an equal forum to the union spokesman.30
Practical considerations equally argue for a broad interpretation of Bill.
more. Under any but a flat rule granting the union a reply speech under
equivalent conditions, the Board and courts would necessarily have to investi-
gate and evaluate a multitude of dissimilar fact situations. In each case, the
availability and effectiveness of alternative union reply methods to an employer
on-the-job talk would have to be weighed. 40 And employers, uncertain of
Board criteria and prohibited by the Act from surveillance and interrogation of
37. The major survey of political campaign channels found informal personal conver-
sations more effective than the more formal media of newspapers, radio and formal ad-
dresses. LAZARSFELD, BmuLSON & GAUDFT, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE 150-1 (1948). But one
of the two bases of that conclusion was greater coverage. And the full attendance of an
on-the-job speech may undermine the conclusion in the labor context.
At mass meetings, not only does an interaction between the speaker and each auditor
exist but, also, relationships among the listeners through the emotional stimulus of a crowd
may reinforce the admonitions and urgings of the speaker. KEY, POLITICAL PARTIES AND
PREssuRE GROUPS 595 (1947).
38. See Note, Employer's Speech during Working Hours as Unfair Labor Practice,
14 U. OF CH. L. Rav. 104 (1946). Social scientists have noted "deference patterns" pre-
disposing people to Tespond automatically towards those to whom they have been in the
custom of responding. Thus, while they are in the plant, employees customarily obey the
instructions of company supervisors and officials. Habitual responses of this type tend to
operate whether the employee is responding to the desires of the employer that he should
perform some shop operation or that he should pursue some less objective course-such
as voting against a certain union. In addition, the display of power inherent in the com-
pulsory audience is itself of considerable psychological significance. See id. at 108-9, and
sources cited therein.
39. Alternatively, in extreme cases where employees are brought to the company
offices and addressed individually or in small groups, the speech has been entirely con-
demned, without consideration of potential union replies. Employers' urgings to reject a
union "uttered in that locus of final authority in the plant take on a meaning and a signifi-
cance they do not possess under other circumstances." The resultant subtle coercion war-
rants setting aside the election regardless of the speech content. General Shoe Corp., 97
N.L.R.B. No. 71 (Dec. 12, 1951). Accord, General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948),
distinguished in Hinde & Dauch Paper Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 488, 490 (1948); Gray Drug
Stores, 79 N.L.R.B. 1140, 1141 (1948); Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 79 N.L.R.B. 1399
(1948). The sole reliance in the Board's most recent case on the previous General Shoe
decision implies limitation of its holding to relpresentation cases where § 8(c) may not
apply. See note 26 supra. For argument that mere setting aside of elections without power
to order cessation of condemned conduct may be ineffectual to curb future violations, see
Note, Free Speech and Free Choice in Representation Elections: Effect of Tafl-Hartley
Act § 8(c), 58 YALE L.J. 165, 174 (1948).
40. For union organizational techniques, see notes 35-8 supra.
Comparative effectiveness of various media depends on such factors as the number of
employees; physical location, structure, and immediate surroundings of the plant or place
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employees to determine the exctent and effectiveness of union activities,4'
could not measure their legal obligation to grant a reply. Inevitably, con-
fusion and litigious labor-management strife would flourish.
Bonwit Teller and Biltmore will also shape decisions involving employer
campaign media other than on-the-job speeches. Under the first rationale of
Bonwit Teller, anti-union propaganda even by the employer himself is now
governed by the restrictions of a company no-solicitation rule.4 3 For example,
management's exclusive use of plant bulletin boards for anti-union campaign-
ing has already been held a violation as a discriminatory application of a no-
solicitation rule.44 Even in the absence of such a rule, the Biltmore doctrine
of equal opportunity might demand equivalent union space on plant bulletin
boards, a potent campaign medium among employees.4 5 Employers' utilization
of communications channels not foreclosed to the union would of course not
be subject to a right of reply. Employer-conducted meetings or social gather-
ings, for example, convening off the plant and in hours other than working
of business; size of the city or town where employees live and comparative location of
their living quarters to each other, to their place of employment and the union meeting
hall; employee level of literacy; presence and extent of company rules restricting union
solicitation on company time and premises; timing of employee shifts and amount of non-
working time spent by employees at the plant, including lunch hours and rest periods;
and amount of money and number of organizers available to the union.
41. Employees have a right to privacy concerning their union activities, and em-
ployers' attempts to secure such information either indirectly through espionage or sur-
veillance or directly by interrogating the individual employees are held unlawful. For re-
view of the NLRB rationale and case authority, see Standard-Coosa-Thacher, 85 N.LR.B.
1353 (1949). Interrogation is unprotected by § 8(c) because not an expression of "views,
arguments, or opinions." It is inherently coercive since it instills fear of subsequent dis-
crimination and hence per se violates § 8(a) (1). Id. at 1362; NLRB v. Minnesota Mining
and Mfg. Co., 179 F2d 323, 326 (Sth Cir. 1950). But cf. NLRB v. Winer, 29 LAn. REL
REP. (Labor-Management) 2538, 2541 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769, 773
(7th Cir. 1949).
42. For surveys of the use of various management media of communication with
workers, see PEruns, CommuIcATioN WITHIN INDusTRY 42, 43 (1950). See also BAKER,
BALLANTINE & TRUE cc. 4, 11; BAKER, COMPANY-WIDE UNDERSTANDING OF IlNDUSTRIAL
RE.ATI NS PoLcms, A STUDY IN CommuNicAXioxs c. 4 (1948) ; BAxER ,Nm FRabcE,
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS IN DEPARTMENT STOaRs c. 4 (1950) ;
GILBERTSON, PERSONNEL POLICIES AND UNIONISM c. 19 (1950) ; Gracey, Effecti'e CoVn-
munications, 29 PERSONNEL J. 86 (1950).
43. See note 17 supra.
44. Cherry Rivet Co., 97 N.L.R.B. No. 212 (Jan. 29, 1952).
45. Bulletin boards are the most commonly used management conmunication medium.
PErEs, CoMmuNcATioN WITHIN INDUSTRY 42, 43 (1950). One survey ranked them first
as the principal source of employee information on company policies. BAKR, BA.AN.TIE
& TR E at 26. Bulletin boards were chosen by employees as the most popular and con-
venient medium of management communication. Id. at 42. Even if the value of the bulletin
board is less for argumentation than for dissemination of factual information, see note 33
mspra, the great number of employees accustomed to reading posted material makes it
important. This is recognized by unions; most collective bargaining agreements contain a
stipulation for union use of certain company bulletin boards. PErms, op. cit. supra, at 70.
1077
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
time, can easily be met by equivalent union meetings.40 Similarly, employers'
letters, leaflets, company newspapers or magazines, and commercial advertis-
ing in the local press are open to union rebuttal in equal ways.47 If an em-
ployer, however, addressed unorganized employees on the premises immedi-
ately before or after working time,48 singularly suited to convenient attend-
ance, an opportunity to reply under equivalent conditions might well have to
be granted the union; campaign equality would be fostered at practically no
employer expense or disruption of his business. And in all cases the employer
should be free to require that the union communication to the employees pre-
cede his own; Biltmore may require only equality of opportunity, not a
guarantee to the union of the "last word" in every campaign4 0
Bonwit Teller and Biltmore do not muzzle employers' "free speech" or
emasculate Section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act. True, court affirmance of
46. For suggestion that proper application of an equal opportunity rule would include
the right of an employer to address union hall audiences, see Bonwit Teller, 96 N.L,R.B,
No. 73, p. 13 (dissenting opinion). But opportunity to invite employees to attend volun-
tarily a meeting outside of working hours is open to both union and management. The
same does not hold true of speeches on company time and premises.
47. For information on the enumerated media, see note 42 supra. Company periodicals
are one of the most effective media of communication between management and em-
ployees. See Jones, The Employee Magazine in Successful Industrial Relations, 29 PER-
SONNEL J. 47 (1951) ; Beach, Employee Magazines Build Morale, id. at 216; Masters,
Employee News Publications, 6 Pum RmAnUoNs 3. 14 (Mar. 1951). Unions may put out
their own newspapers or magazines and can compete for reader interest on the same basis
as the employer. While union periodicals usually have not been as widely read, improve-
ment of union publications might attract greater audiences. See BAKE, BALLANTINE &
TRUE 36, 51, 112; PETS, COMMUNICATION WITHIN INDUSTRY 132 (1950). Plant news-
papers have been successfully used in union organizing drives. BARBAsn, LABOR UNIONS
IN ACmON 25 (1948).
But most company periodicals steer away from obvious propagandizing and the con-
troversial subjects involved in an anti-union campaign. See Benson, Employee Newspapers,
6 PUB. RELATIONS J. 14, 27 (1951) (description of Gen. Shoe Corp. periodical) ; Masters,
supra at 16; Beach, supra at 217.
Union leaflets and periodicals are probably entitled to the protection of the Bon4t
Teller and Biltmore holdings as to distribution privileges on company premises.
48. But cf. Meier & Frank, 89 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1950) (employer anti-tnion speech half-
hour before store opens to employees not being paid for their time; held privileged prior
to Bonwit Teller, but no union reply request).
While employees must usually be permitted to indulge in union proselytizing during
off-hours normally spent on company premises, see note 10 supra, management has not
been required to permit organized meetings. Fafner Ball Bearing Co., 26 War Lab. Rep.
308, 311 (1945).
49. See Biltmore dissent, 97 N.L.R.B. No. 128, p. 6: "[U]nions, if they so desire, must
now be accorded the privilege of having the last word in an election campaign." The
Board opinion indiscriminately uses "right of reply" and "right to hear both sides
of the story." But the "right to hear both sides" seems the fundamental basis of the case.
If no other campaign opportunity is equivalent to an on-the-job speech, a "right to reply"
probably simply guarantees campaign equality, not "last words."
[Vol, 611078
NOTES
Bonwit Teller 50 will dictate caution to employers contemplating on-the-job
campaigns; granting an equivalent opportunity to unions would furnish them
a potent propaganda device and cost the employer for additional working
time lost.5 But although the number of employer speeches may thus be cur-
tailed, 52 the employer continues free to express his non-coercive opinions on-
the-job to employees-provided only that his monopoly utilization of a most
effective campaign medium is shared.53 And if he is unwilling to permit a
50. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 22203 (2d Cir.), was argued before Judges
Frank, A. Hand, and Swan on April 14, 1952, and is now awaiting decision.
Biltmore and its sequels not involving unfair labor practice charges probably will not
be appealed. There is no direct judicial review of representation cases. Courts of Appeals
may review only cease and desist orders. A.F.L. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 401 (1940). However,
if the employer refuses to bargain collectively after a union victory in a new election or
the setting aside of a decertification election, an appealable unfair labor practice proceed-
ing might follow under § S(a) (5), permitting collateral attack on the Board ruling setting
aside the original election. Despite House attempts to permit direct court review of repre-
sentation proceedings, the practice remained unchanged by the Taft-Hartley Act. Con-
ference Report, H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1947). See Note, 58 YArx
L.J. 165, 174 (1948).
51. Whether the union must pay for its use of company time and facilities to reply
to the employer on-the-job speech was thought unsettled. Note, Employer Who Addresses
Captive Audience Must Give Union Equal Opportuni y, 65 H.fnmv. L REv. 695, 696 (1931).
But Bonuit Teller did not mention compensation nor did subsequent "equal opportunity"
cases. And unions do not pay rent for soliciting members on company premises or reim-
burse the employer for paid lunch and rest periods utilized for union organizing activities.
See note 10 supra. If the meetings took place at the union's initiative, compensation might
be validly demanded, since on-the-job speeches involve production time. In all "equal op-
portunity" cases, however, the employer's initiative provokes the union reply and should
take into account these consequences. Moreover, argument for reimbursement assumes
some feasible system of determining and allocating the variable costs of the additional
production or sales time lost by the union reply could be devised.
52. See 28 LAB. REL. REP. (Analysis) 105, 108 (Oct. 8, 1951).
53. The new "equal opportunity" rule differs sharply from discredited "captive audi-
ence" doctrine condemned by § 8(c) and its legislative history. See note 6 Micra. Whether
employees are "forced to listen" to the employer speech is now immaterial. See note 13
supra. The employer is not proscribed from on-the-job speechmaking, and the Board made
no finding that an employer's speech on company time and property is coercive. See notes
39 and 40 supra. "XVe do not proscribe, nor find illegal what the Respondent said, or the
manner in which it assembled its audience. We are concerned with what the Respondent
refused to do.... We leave the Respondent free to exercise fully its right of free speech.
We say only that when it chose to speak under the circumstances involved here, then ...
it could not lawfully deny the union's reasonable request for an opportunity to reply
under the same circumstances." Bonvit Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. No. 73, at p. 10.
For an analogous requirement of "equal opportunity" for all candidates in the use of
radio facilities in an election campaign, see FEDEMAL COsuN cTio. Zs AcT, 44 STAT. 10s
(1934), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1946) ; Note, 61 YALE L.J. 87 (1952). The same requirement
would aply where the station owner himself is a candidate. No obligation to accept cam-
paign speeches initially is imposed on the station owner. Id. at 83. The imposition of such
a requirement on radio stems from the limited availability of radio frequencies. See Na-
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union reply speech on company premises and time, he must merely limit him-
self to campaign methods open to unions as well.
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). Scuttling a prior
policy of forbidding station editorialization, Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C 333
(1940), the FCC now permits the licensee to express his views on all issues, provided
the overall treatment of any issue includes fair presentation of all viewpoints. Editorializ-
ing by Broadcast Licensee, 1 PIKE & FiscHER RADIo REG. 91, 201, 212 (1949) ; Note, 59
YALE LJ. 759 (1949).
After this Note went to press, the Second Circuit decided Bonwit Teller. Bonwit Teller
v. NLRB, No. 22208, 2d Cir., June 17, 1952. The majority opinion agreed with the Board
that the employer had applied its own no-solicitation rule discriminatorily when it conducted
an anti-union campaign "on the same premises to which the Union was denied access; if
it should be otherwise, the practical advantage to the employer ... would constitute a
serious interference with the right of his employees to organize." The dissent disagreed
with the majority's statement that "neither § 8(c) nor any issue of 'employer free speech'
is involved." It contended that § 8(c) entitled the employer to make on-the-job speeches
even where a no-solicitation rule was in effect. Both opinions, however, rejected the broader
rationale of equal opportunity, the majority declaring that "[iJf Bonwit Teller were to
abandon [the no-solicitation] rule, we do not think it would then be required to accord the
Union a similar opportunity to address the employees each time [the employer] made an
anti-union speech ... so long as the avenues of communication are kept open to both sides,"
Thus the court ruled the Board's order "too broadly drawn," denied enforcement, and'
remanded for modification. The decision, though not referring to Bilnorc, flatly contra-
dicted that NLRB ruling, drawing its status into doubt.
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